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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Until the validity and scope of the Jones decision is resolved, the
vicinage problem will be left open as one of the more serious questions
to be faced by state and federal courts in providing for effective and
efficient administration of justice.
WM. HENRY JERNIGAN, JR.

INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS AND § 337 OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
When a corporation terminates its business, liquidates its assets,
and moves towards dissolution, it may avoid taxation on the gain
realized from the sale of most types of appreciated property' by following the statutory guidelines of § 337 of the Internal Revenue
Code.' This section, providing for the nonrecognition of the gain at
the corporate level, was enacted in response to two seemingly irreconcilable Supreme Court decisions3 in which corporate taxpayers were
become apparent should the court be faced with the same question in People v. Bernstein. See note 7 supra. In that case, there is no indication of any racial imbalance
between the two areas involved.
'For purposes of § 337, "property" does not include stock in trade of the corporation, inventory, property held primarily for the sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business, or installment obligations unless sold in one transaction to one person. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337(b). Such assets are similarly excluded from capital gains
treatment by the definition of "property used in the trade or business." INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 1231(b).
IINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337(a) provides that:
General Rule.-If(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or
after June 22, 1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the
adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange
by it of property within such 12-month period.
'InCommissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), the taxpayer, a close
corporation, had been negotiating for the sale of an apartment building, its principal
asset. Before an agreement was reached, the corporation liquidated, distributing the
asset in kind to the same shareholders who had been conducting the prior negotiations
for the corporation. The asset was then sold to the party that had been in contact with
the corporation. In holding that the corporation had actually made the sale, the Court
refused to permit the true nature and purpose of the transactions to be disguised by
mere formalisms.
Five years later, the Court decided United States v. Cumberland Public Service
Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950). In that instance, a private utility corporation offered to sell
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attempting to liquidate and pass assets in kind to their shareholders.
These cases illustrated that when assets were distributed in kind to
shareholders, the corporation incurred no tax on the distribution;4
but when the corporation itself sold the assets and distributed the
proceeds, the corporation was taxed on the gain from the liquidating
sales. 5 The Supreme Court in the earlier case found that the corporation had negotiated the sale of the assets to the purchaser before
distributing them to the selling shareholders, but that in the later
case the shareholders had consummated the sale even though the
distribution in kind followed a breakoff in negotiations. Because the
factual distinctions drawn by the Court were not clearly delineated,
the decisions created a trap for the unwary corporation which was
contemplating liquidation, and Congress responded in 1954 by enacting § 337 to clarify the situation.6
Section 337 provides that a corporation which has adopted a plan
for liquidation and dissolution can avoid taxation on any gain realized from the sale or exchange of property as defined by that section.'
The statutory requirements are: 1) that the corporation adopt the
plan on or after June 22, 1954; 2) that all assets are distributed within
12 months of the adoption of the plan less assets retained to meet
claims; and 3) that the sale or exchange takes place within the 12month period. Thus, Congress spelled out precisely how a corporation
could effect the desired result, eliminating the artificial distinctions
created by the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, the statute has failed its essential purpose. A cloud
of uncertainty has developed regarding the applicability of § 337 to
involuntary conversions. The Eighth and Sixth Circuits have taken
its stock to a newly formed cooperative. The cooperative counter-offered to purchase
the operating assets of the private utility outright. The taxpayer refused and instead
adopted a plan of liquidation and distributed the assets in kind. The shareholders then
sold the operating assets to the cooperative and the Court found that the sale had been
made by the shareholders and not by the corporation.
'Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-19 (1939).
'Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-21 (1939).
'While this article deals with a specific problem area of § 337, the reader may wish
to refer to other material dealing with § 337 in general. See, e.g., Tax-Free Sales in
LiquidationUnder Section 337, 76 HARv. L. REv. 780 (1963); Bittker, The Taxation of
Complete Liquidations, 8 TUL. TAX INST. 610 (1959); Bittker & Eustice, Complete
Liquidation and Related Problems, 26 TAX. L. REv. 191 (1970); Bonovitz, Current
LiquidationProblems under § 334(b)(2) and § 337 Distributions and Reserves, 30
N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX 1095 (1972); Mahon, Section 337-12 Month Liquidations: What
Constitutes a Plan; Disposition of Assets; Suggested Clauses for a Plan, 28 N.Y.U.
INST. FED. TAX 691 (1970).
'Note 1 supra.
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opposite positions on the question of whether a corporation which has
suffered a causalty to insured property may adopt a plan of liquidation and dissolution under § 337 before reaching an agreement with
the insurer and thereby avoid recognition of the gain realized on
receipt of the proceeds. In 1968 the Eighth Circuit in United States
v. Morton5 permitted nonrecognition of gain at the corporate level.
More recently, the Sixth Circuit denied such treatment in Central
Tablet Manufacturing Co. v. United States.' In each case, the taxpayer had not contemplated liquidation prior to the casualty to its
property but soon thereafter decided that the casualty presented an
appropriate circumstance for winding up the business. Although a
definitive solution has not been judicially determined or legislated,
it appears that the Commissioner can present strong arguments and
that the position of the court in Central Tablet will prevail in future
litigation.' 0 For the tax practitioner faced with this particular chain
of events, an examination and analysis of the arguments and issues
raised thus far may prove helpful."
2
The statutory language of § 337 and the regulations thereunder'
'387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968).
9481 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973)
(No. 593).
"The Ninth Circuit is now considering the appeal in Kinney v. United States, 731 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,128 (N.D. Cal. 1972), which followed the holding of Morton in the
district court. The court in Kinney also cited as controlling the district court in Central
Tablet Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ohio 1972), which
had permitted nonrecognition.
The question has also been raised in at last three cases at the administrative level.
The cases are Fisher Baking Company (L-191-A Code 411) pending before the District
Director of Internal Revenue, Salt Lake City, Utah; Estate of Max Goldberg (L-1973
Code B 430), pending before the District Director of Internal Revenue, Indianapolis,
Indiana; James F. White, Transferee of the Assets of Floyd Dugan Chevrolet, Inc.,
Toledo, Ohio, pending before the District Director of Internal Revenue, Cleveland,
Ohio.
"The reader may also wish to refer to Kovey, When will Section 337 shield fire
loss proceeds? A current look at a burningissue, 39 J. TAx. 258 (November 1973), which
deals with the same topic discussed here. Mr. Kovey also discusses the question of the
taxpayer's accounting method, a topic beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, a cash
basis taxpayer realizes income from an insurance settlement when the proceeds are
received while an accrual method taxpayer realizes the gain when there has been an
unqualified recognition of liability by the insurer and the insured can estimate the
settlement. The Government argued that because the taxpayer in CentralTablet used
an accrual method of accounting, gain was realized when the casualty reduced the
assets to a claim against the insured. The taxpayer in Morton used a cash basis
accounting method and therefore the cases were distinguishable. The Sixth Circuit's
opinion in Central Tablet never addressed this argument, but the point has been
resurrected by the Government in its appeal of Kinney.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2(a) (1955) states:

420

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

'
refer only to a "sale or exchange by [the corporation] of property. '1
In early application of the section, the Commissioner strictly interpreted this phraseology and refused to include involuntary conversions within the scope of sale or exchange under § 337. In a revenue
ruling issued shortly after the enactment of the section, the Internal
Revenue Service took the position that a corporation suffering a causalty to appreciated property during the 12-month period of § 337
would have to recognize any gain realized from the insurance proceeds" because the involuntary conversion was not a sale or exchange."5 This literal reading of the phrase "sale or exchange" to
exclude involuntary conversions had become an accepted principle of
statutory construction originating with the decision of Helvering v.
William Flaccus Oak Leather Co. 6
In Flaccus, the Supreme Court was asked to construe the coverage
of § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,'1 the forerunner of the
capital gains sections of the current Internal Revenue Code. 8 The
corporate taxpayer had realized a gain when its entire operating plant
was destroyed by fire and it received insurance proceeds in excess of
the adjusted basis of the property. The Court denied the taxpayer

Provided the other conditions of section 337 are met, sales or exchanges which occur on or after the date on which the plan of complete
liquidation is adopted and within the 12-month period thereafter are
subject to the provisions of such section. The date on which a sale
occurs depends primarily upon the intent of the parties to be gathered
from the terms of the contract and the surrounding circumstances. In
ascertaining whether a sale or exchange occurs on or after the date on
which the plan of complete liquidation is adopted, the fact that negotiations for sale have been commenced, either by the corporation or
its stockholders, or both shall be disregarded.Moreover, an executory

contract to sell is to be distinguished from a contract of sale. Ordinarily a sale has not occurred when a contract to sell has been entered
into but title and possession of the property have not been transferred
and the obligation of the seller to sell or the buyer to buy is conditional
(emphasis added).
See notes 44-50 infra and accompanying text for a discussion and evaluation of the
reliance upon these regulations by the Eighth Circuit in Morton.
'INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337(a).
'"The ruling drew a strict delineation between an involuntary conversion and a sale
or exchange. Rev. Rul. 372, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 187, 188.
'"Nonrecognition of the gain was available to the corporation if the proceeds were
reinvested in accordance with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1033, but that section would
be of little assistance to the corporation if the decision to liquidate had been irrevocably made. See note 57 infra.
U.S. 247 (1941).
'IINT.REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117.
'"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201 et seq.
1313
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capital gains treatment under § 117 because the section referred
only to sales or exchanges of capital assets.'" The Court reasoned that:
Generally speaking, the language in the Revenue Act, just as
in any statute, is to be given its ordinary meaning, and thewords "sale" and "exchange" are not to be read any differently. . . .Neither term is appropriate to characterize the
demolition of property and subsequent compensation for its
0
loss by an insurance company.
Although the Court agreed that the taxpayer's assets had been converted into a claim against the insurer, they had not been strictly sold
or exchanged and therefore the transaction was outside the coverage
of § 117.
This rigid reading of the sale or exchange language of § 337 continued to be applied by the Commissioner whenever the taxpayer's
property was involuntarily converted by a casualty following the
adoption of a plan of liquidation.2' Finally, in 1960, the Court of
Claims took the initiative in granting nonrecognition under § 337 to
a gain produced by a casualty in Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United
States.22 In Towanda, the corporation had entered into a plan of
liquidation and dissolution pursuant to § 337, but before it could
consummate its liquidating sales the assets were destroyed by fire.
The gain subsequently realized on the receipt of insurance proceeds
in excess of the adjusted basis of the destroyed assets was allowed § 337 treatment and not recognized at the corporate level. The
court was not inclined to deny such treatment simply because the
taxpayer suffered an involuntary rather than voluntary conversion
during liquidation. Conceding that an involuntary conversion was not
a sale or exchange, the court nevertheless reasoned that what Congress intended when it enacted § 337 was a conversion of assets and
the distribution of the resulting cash to the stockholders.n Whether
this conversion was involuntary was of no consequence for determining the applicability of § 337 .4 Drawing upon this presumed con"IINT. Rzv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a). Subsequent to the Flaccus decision, § 117(j)
was added to include involuntary conversions.
2313 U.S. at 249.
"By 1959, the Commissioner had acquiesced to he extent of including involuntary
conversion by condemnation within the purview of sale or exchange, providing the plan
of liquidation was adopted prior to the passage of title to the condemnor. Rev. Rul.
108, 1959-1 CuM. BuLL. 72. See explanation of acquiescence procedure at note 32 infra.
22180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
2Id. at 376.
2
1Id.
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gressional intent, the court extended the coverage of § 337 to involuntary conversions occasioned on a corporation in the process of liquidation. While the court thus included within the coverage of § 337
involuntary conversions occurring during liquidation, it is important
to note that involuntary conversions were not equated to sales or
exchanges, a distinction relied upon and argued in subsequent cases.
Shortly after Towanda, the Fourth Circuit endorsed the Court of
Claims' analysis of § 337 in Kent Manufacturing Corp. v.
Commissioner.25 The taxpayer corporation in Kent had suffered an
explosion of its plant and equipment, and subsequently the Board of
Directors adopted a plan of liquidation and dissolution which was
completed during 1954. Prior to the date of the adoption of the plan,
an insurance settlement was reached fixing the amount of the proceeds for the casualty in excess of the corporation's adjusted basis.
Shortly thereafter, the settlement was received. In filing its final tax
return, the corporation did not report the gain realized from the insurance proceeds, claiming that it qualified for nonrecognition treatment under either § 337 or § 392.2 Section 392, enacted as a companion to § 337, afforded nonrecognition "to [a liquidating] corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property during the calendar
year 1954. ' ' 21 The court agreed with the taxpayer that § 392 applied
to the gain from the insurance because there was no requirement in
that section that the plan of liquidation precede the sale or exchange,
but the opinion postulated that § 337 was inapplicable due to the
timing of the various transactions. This determination thus reaffirmed the holding of Towanda-§ 337, as well as § 392 in the instant case, was intended to apply to involuntary conversions occurring during liquidation.2
After deciding that Congress must have meant to include involun-288 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1961).
6

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 392.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 392(b)(1).
2
8The court specifically and continually intertwined its discussion of § 392 and
§ 337: "The words 'sale or exchange,' as used in §§ 337 and 392 are given a reasonable
construction if they are held to include every transaction, which, by previously enacted
provisions of law, is required to be treated as a sale or exchange. An earlier specific
definition may properly color a subsequent use of the same words without redefinition." 288 F.2d at 815. The court stated in conclusion that "[blecause of the provisions of § 1231, we think the words 'sale or exchange' as used in §§ 337 and 392 include
involuntary conversions suffered under these circumstances." Id. at 816. The circumstances which the court apparently was referring to were those of an involuntary
conversion by casualty which occurred during liquidation, since the court immediately
preceding the latter statement had cited such an example and concluded that the
taxpayer should be allowed nonrecognition treatment.
2
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tary conversions occurring during liquidation within the purview
of § 337 and § 392, the court in Kent opined that because "the
involuntary conversion and realization of the gain occurred before the
adoption of the liquidation plan," 29 the taxpayer could not rely
on § 337 for nonrecognition. The court succinctly stated that "§ 337
does not apply. That section applies only to gain from sales or exchanges within the 12-month period following adoption of a plan of
complete liquidation. No such limitation appears in § 392(b)(1),
however." 3 0
Even though the decision in Kent was based on an interpretation
of the language of § 392, it is difficult to overlook the consideration
that the court gave to § 337 and its conclusion regarding the inapplicability of that section to the facts presented. The quoted language
above, though arguably dictum, indicates that as the court understood § 337, a casualty to insured property resulting in the realization of a gain prior to the adoption of a plan of liquidation would not
qualify for nonrecognition under that section."
In 1964, the Commissioner acquiesced to the decisions of Towanda
and Kent, interpreting §§ 337 and 392 to include involuntary conversions arising from casualties to insured property.3 2 However, the ruling issued did not address the timing problem raised but unanswered
in Kent regarding § 337.3 The Commissioner stated that such con2M. at 816.

,id.
31

The importance of the occurrence of both the casualty and the realization of gain
prior to adoption of a plan is uncertain from the opinion. These facts are distinguishable from those presented in Mortonwhere the taxpayer reached a settlement and thus
realized gain after adoption of the plan. Assuming arguendo that Kent rests on the
proposition that the taxpayer was not eligible for § 337 because gain was realized
before a plan was adopted, then Kent lends support to the ratiocination of Morton.
See notes 43-46 infra and accompanying text.
nIn acquiescing, the Commissioner indicates that the Government will no longer
contest the issue if again presented by the same or indistinguishable facts. See 9 J.
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 50.94 (1971). In the situation of an
involuntary conversion during the 12-month period after adoption of a plan of liquidation under § 337, the acquiescence meant that a gain from such conversion would
qualify for nonrecognition treatment as a sale or exchange. Rev. Rul. 100, 1964-1. CUM.
BULL. 130, 131. The earlier revenue ruling which stated an opposite position was
thereby revoked. Note 14 supra.
3Rev. Rul. 100, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 130, 313 provides that:
[c]onsistent with the Towanda Textiles, Inc. and Kent Manufacturing Corp. decisions, involuntary conversion of property of the type
described in § 337 of the Code by reason of destruction by fire will be
treated as sales or exchanges for purposes of that section where such
conversions result in a loss as well as gain, regardless of whether such
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versions would be treated as sales or exchanges, but at that time he
neither established when the casualty must occur or when the involuntary conversion shall be deemed to have occurred. Moreover, neither guidelines nor regulations have since been promulgated. It seems
clear that this lack of guidance is at least partly responsible for the
disparity between the circuits which Morton and Central Tablet have
now created.
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits were presented parallel circumstances in Morton" and Central Tablet35 as the operative facts pertinent to § 337. In both instances, the corporation suffered a destruction of substantially all of its operating assets. Following the casualty,
but before an insurance settlement was reached, each corporation
adopted a plan for liquidation and dissolution to take place within
the statutory 12-month period. Sometime after the adoptionof such
plan, each corporation reached agreement with its insurers as to the
amount of the proceeds to be paid for the destroyed property. In both
cases, the proceeds greatly exceeded the adjusted basis of the property destroyed so that each corporation realized a significant gain.
The proceeds, less funds retained for future claims against the dissolved corporation, were received by the corporation and distributed
to the stockholders within the requisite 12-month period. Each corporation was wound up within a year of the adoption of the liquidation
plan. Thus, it would be virtually impossible to distinguish these cases
on the facts presented and the court in Central Tablet properly made
no attempt to do so. 36
The courts reached opposite results, even though faced with strikproperty is the type described in § 1231 of the Code and regardless of
whether such property has been held for more or less than 6 months.
31
1n Morton, the rental property owned by the corporation was destroyed by fire
on October 30, 1960. Thereafter, on November 28, 1960, a resolution providing for
liquidation and dissolution was passed by the Board of Directors and ratified by the
shareholders at a meeting on December 10, 1960. A settlement offer was accepted by
the Board of Directors on December 29, 1960, and payment was received on January
28, 1961. 387 F.2d at 443. These proceeds and the remaining assets of the corporation
were distributed to the shareholders within 12 months of the adoption of the plan of
liquidation.
3The fire on September 10, 1965, damaged or destroyed the greater part of the
corporation's equipment, building and inventory in Central Tablet. 481 F.2d at 956.
On May 14, 1966, the shareholders voted to liquidate, dissolve the corporation, and
distribute its assets. An agreement on the building claim was reached with the insurer
on May 20, 1966, and on August 25, 1966, as to other claims. Payment was made on
June 15, 1966, for the building claim and November 17, 1966, for the personal property
claim. On May 3, 1967, a reserve was deposited in trust for the shareholders awaiting
payment of final debts in completion of liquidation. Id. at 957.
'Id. at 958.
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ingly similar factual situations, because each court dealt with decidedly different issues. The Eighth Circuit viewed the taxpayer's transations in Morton as analogous to a commercial sale. The Sixth Circuit in Central Tablet concerned itself with the threshold question of
congressional intent. By analyzing these theories it is possible to
understand how and why the different results were reached.
The court in Morton began its analysis with a discussion of cases
dealing with involuntary conversion by condemnation, for, in order
to reach a decision favorable to the taxpayer, those cases had to be
distinguished from cases involving an involuntary conversion by casualty. In the condemnation situation, § 337 had been previously
applied with a fair degree of uniformity. 37 The significant factor in a
condemnation case for determinining whether a gain will qualify for
nonrecognition under § 337 is the date when title passes to the condemning authority. In order to ascertain this date, which determines
the date of sale or exchange for purposes of § 337, a court must look
to local law. Reference to local law is necessary since actual passage
of title occurs at different times depending on the particular legislative grant of the eminent domain power.3 Consequently, in jurisdictions where the title to property passes to the condemnor in an ex
parte proceeding, 9 the owner may not have time to adopt a plan of
liquidation prior to the passage of title. While it would be difficult to
conceive of a situation where an owner of real property was completely without knowledge of an impending condemnation," the court
in Morton noted that courts had had little difficulty in denying § 337
treatment to an unfortunate corporation which had not adopted a
plan before title passed."
nIn Rev. Rul. 180, 1959-1 CuM. BuLL. 72, the Commissioner established that "once
title and possession have passed to the condemning authority, 'negotiations' have been
concluded" for purposes of § 337.
"For example, in federal condemnation cases, the sale occurs when a declaration
of taking is filed in court and a deposit made therein to cover estimated compensation.
Title to the property will then be vested in the United States under 44 1-4 of the
Federal Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258a-d (1970). See Covered Wagon,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 369 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1966).
31For example, under Pennsylvania law, the condemnor shall be entitled to possession or right of entry upon a written offer to pay the condemnee an estimated just
amount of compensation. 26 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1-407 (Supp. 1973). See note 38 supra
regarding federal ex parte proceedings.
4
See, e.g., West Street-Erie Boulevard Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 738 (2d
Cir. 1969), where the taxpayer had anticipated the condemnation and adopted a plan
of liquidation before any official action was taken by the condemning authority.
"E.g., Dwight v. United States, 328 F.2d 973, 974 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'g per curiam
225 F. Supp. 933 (N.D.N.Y. 1963), where the court unsympathetically declared:
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The Morton court distinguished the condemnation cases from the
seemingly analogous situation of the casualty loss on the basis that
no passage of title was involved in the destruction of insured assets.
The involuntary conversion was commenced by the catastrophe but
did not occur for purposes of § 337 at least until the amount of the
proceeds was fixed by agreement or judgment.2 Thus, although title
to corporate property could pass without the corporation's knowledge
at the outset of an involuntary conversion by condemnation and
threby disqualify that corporation for § 337 treatment, a corporation
which suffered an involuntary converstion by casualty could qualify
for § 337 treatment by adopting a plan prior to the finalization of the
insurance settlement. Under the Morton rationale, until such time as
the proceeds are determinable, the conversion has not been completed.
Having thus distinguished condemnation and casualty cases on
the basis that the respective conversions are completed by different
events, the court developed an analogy of the casualty and resulting
insurance settlement to a commercial sale.4 3 The court reasoned that
the conversion of assets by casualty into a chose in action against the
insurer for an undetermined amount could not be considered a completed sale or exchange. After the casualty there will usually be various formal requirements which the insured must meet in order to
preserve the claim. More importantly, the parties will negotiate to
arrive at a final settlement amount in a manner much the same as
bargaining for a price in a sale. Until such time as the policy proceeds
are received, or at least an enforceable settlement of a determinable
"Hence the corporation had no opportunity to adopt a plan of liquidation before
condemnation, and the conditions of § 337 could not be met. This may appear to be
a harsh result, but if it is to be corrected Congress must act; the courts have no power
to do so." Accord, Wendell v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1964) (adoption of
§ 337 plan came after title passed under New York law but before final decree was
entered fixing the amount of compensation); A. T. Newell Realty Co., 53 T.C. 130
(1969) (Urban Redevelopment Authority's letter making a "reasonable" offer to taxpayer was sufficient to pass title under Pennsylvania statute).
"The court in Morton reasoned that "[slince no title is involved in a fire loss case
of this type, we think the catastrophe is but the commencement of an involuntary
conversion that does not come into fruition until, at least, the amount to be received
by way of reimbursement for that loss is decided either by agreement or by court
action." 387 F.2d at 447.
13It appears inconsistent for the Morton court to use an analogy to a commercial
sale, which would seem always to involve the passage of title, and at the same time to
disregard the relevance of the condemnation cases to the casualty situation because a
casualty does not involve the passage of title. The Morton court thus seemed to pick
and choose from tax accounting concepts as it needed them, using those which supported its conclusion and disregarding those which created problems.
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amount is agreed upon, the "sale or exchange" has not been completed."
It appears that the court's position in Morton was that the casualty was but the first in a series of events which may or may not
culminate in the realization of a gain. This uncertainty, which the
court ostensibly likened to the negotiations permitted in the regulations" prior to the adoption of a plan of liquidation, could not be
considered a sale or exchange under § 337 until an insurance settlement was finally reached. 6 Because the taxpayer had adopted its
plan of liquidation during that period of uncertainty, the property
was considered as "sold" after the adoption of the plan and during
the requisite 12-month period.
The Eighth Circuit's analogy takes certain liberties with the two
tax accounting concepts of sale and realization of gain on sale. In
effect, the Eighth Circuit seemed to place a gloss upon § 337 which
made it read "sale or exchange, or in the event of an involuntary
conversion by casualty, when the insurance proceeds are realized."
In a commercial sale, the date of sale is determined by different
criteria than the date of realization of gain and, although these dates
could coincide, property may be sold and the gain not realized for an
extended period. A sale is deemed completed when title and the
accompanying incidents of ownership pass from the seller to the
41387 F.2d at 448.
"See. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2(a), quoted at note 12 supra.
T'he court used language usually reserved for discussion of a commercial sale. "In
any sale or exchange something of value is received for the article sold or exchanged.
Usually in a sale the consideration is money which is readily and presently available
for use by the holder or else comparable property which is of immediate benefit to the
holder." 387 F.2d at 447-48.
The court's analysis crystallizes into the proposition that there can be no sale or
exchange until compensation has been received by the seller. The Government addressed this proposition on brief in Central Tablet:
A sale or exchange is completed when title and the accompanying
incidents of ownership, pass from the seller to the buyer. In many
sales, the ultimate price is contingent upon future events and may not
be finally determined until years after the sale is completed. In others,
the price to be paid may turn upon differing constructions of the terms
of the sale contract and, although resolution may require long litigation, the issue involves only how much the buyer must ultimately pay
the seller and it is not questioned by anyone that the sale was long
ago completed and the property belongs to the buyer-or his assigns
(emphasis added).
Brief for Appellant at 16-17, Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 954
(6th Cir. 1973). The court in Central Tablet declined to express an opinion on the openended sale as described. See notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text.
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buyer. 7 In many sales the price is contingent upon future events and
may not be determined until long after the sale is completed, thereby
deferring realization of gain.8 Realization of gain can also be deferred
for years after the selling price of the property has been decided,
usually when the seller has not received payment in cash or a cash
equivalent. 9 Thus, the court in Morton seemed to blur the concepts
of sale and realization of gain rather severely by holding that the
"sale" occurred when the insurance proceeds were received.
In addition to being unsound from a tax accounting view, the
Morton analysis appears to require more than merely considering an
involuntary conversion as a sale or exchange. The court's analysis
essentially equates the two transactions by defining the former in
terms of the latter. 5 As discussed previously, an involuntary conversion is not strictly a sale or exchange under settled federal tax law51
For purposes of implementing a presumed congressional intent, prior
case law had included involuntary conversions into cash within the
coverage of § 337. In comparing the casualty to a commercial sale
transaction, however, the Morton court seems to have couched its
reasoning in a strained analogy which goes beyond merely interpreting the contressional purpose behind § 337.
The Sixth Circuit, in deciding Central Tablet five years after
Morton, thoroughly disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's analysis. The
analgogy of an involuntary conversion by casualty of insured property
to a commercial sale was specifically rejected,5 2 presumably for the
"7 Fort Hamilton Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1971); Dettmers v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1019, 1023 (6th Cir. 1970); United States Freight Co.
v. United States, 422 F.2d 887, 892-94 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Smith v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.
273 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 418 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1969).
4
The Government cited several examples in its brief in Central Tablet which
would result in deferral of realization of gain. See quoted language at note 46 supra.
"Such deferral of realization can be accomplished by using installment sale contracts or deferred payment plans. See generally INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 453 and the
regulations thereunder.
-'In making this point in its brief, the government used the interesting analogy
that:
[wlhile it is possible to rule judicially that a statutory provision for
apples should be construed to mean that oranges also should be covered, an orange cannot be converted by judicial rule into an apple.
Thus, only confusion and error can result from attempting to decide
whether a particular piece of fruit is an orange, which is thus to be
covered, or an uncovered pear by inquiring as to whether it has a skin
like an apple and seeds, etc.
Brief for Appellant at 14, Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 954 (6th
Cir. 1973).
31See text accompanying note 16 supra.
11481 F.2d at 958.
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reasons previously discussed. The opinion summarily dismissed the
holding of the earlier decision and limited its discussion of the ratiocination of Morton to the statement that the Eighth Circuit had
misapprehended the purpose of § 337.53 The Sixth Circuit apparently
believed that the congressional intent in enacting § 337 forbade its
application to the facts as presented, and the court confined its discussion to this line of reasoning.
The CentralTablet court stated that the purpose of § 337 was to
"establish and easy-to-follow and well-defined corporate procedure"54
so that gain realized upon liquidation of property on dissolution
would pass untaxed at the corporate level to the shareholders. However, the avoidance of double taxation of the gain is really the subsidiary effect of compliance with the statutory requirements; the primary
congressional focus in enacting § 337 was to eliminate the necessity
of determining whether the corporation or its shareholders sold the
assets. " From this somewhat reordered view of the primary congressional intent, the decision went on to discuss the judicial extension
of § 337 treatment to involuntry conversions.
The judicial purpose in extending § 337 to include involuntary
conversions was perceived by the Sixth Circuit as exclusively a means
of dealing equitably with a corporation which had suffered such a loss
after adopting a plan of liquidation. 6 The court agreed that fairness
dictated that this corporation should receive the benefit of § 337, but
it refused to extend what it thought to be an unfair advantage"7 to a
wid.
sId.
5The drafters of § 337 in the House accompanied the text with the following:
Court Holding Company.-Your Committee's bill eliminates questions arising as a result of the necessity of determining whether a
corporation in process of liquidating made a sale of assets or whether
the shareholder receiving the assets made the sale. The [Cumberland
Public Service] decision indicates that if the distributee actually
makes the sale after receipt of the property then there will be no tax
on the sale at the corporate level ....

[B]ut any gain realized will

be taxed to the distributee-shareholder, as ordinary income or capital
gain depending on the character of the asset sold.
H.R. REP. No.1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1954).
vThe Sixth Circuit summarized the earlier decisions by stating that "[t]he judicial extension of the section to provide for nonrecognition of a gain when the assets
are involuntarily converted either by destruction or condemnation was intended to
prevent an injustice to shareholders who had adopted a plan of liquidation but who
thereafter lost their property by destruction or eiminent domain before it could be
sold." 481 F.2d at 960.
OUnder the Morton decision, a corporate taxpayer in a casualty situation is allowed to postpone its decision to utilize § 337 until just before the realization of gain
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corporation which had not adopted a plan of liquidation prior to the
casualty precipitating the involuntary conversion. Congress had
made available to such a corporation the nonrecognition of gain
under § 1033 if the insurance proceeds were reinvested in property
similar or related in use.58 The court concluded its discussion of congressional intent by again stating that § 337 was enacted only "to
prevent double taxation when a corporation is committed to liquidation, and was not intended to serve as a relief measure for taxpayers
who by fortuity suffered a destruction of corporate assets and still
realized a gain." 59
The question of including pre-liquidation plan casualties within
the purview of § 337 had been raised in committee, but Congress took
no steps either to include or to exclude them from the coverage of this
section." The court in Central Tablet, faced with this congressional
silence, refused to legislate judicially what Congress had declined to
consider. The Sixth Circuit apparently did not believe that § 337 was
enacted to allow a corporation an opportunity to pass to its shareholders tax-free gain generated by the pre-liquidation plan involunoccurs, or is at least extremely probably, whereas the corporate taxpayer in the normal
§ 337 situation must realize both gains and losses after the decision to liquidate is
irrevocably made. This choice of action afforded the casualty situation does seem to
be an unfair advantage. But see text accompanying note 65, infra.
='Section 1033 permits the reinvestment in other property similar or related in use
or service to the property converted within a statutory period without recognition of
gain realized by the conversion. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1033.
11481 F.2d at 960.
10The Government on brief in Central Tablet pointed out that:
[i]ndeed, in 1959 the Advisory Group on Subchapter C filed a report
with the Subcommittee on Taxation of the House Ways and Means
Committee in which it pointed out that "an involuntary conversion
cannot be foreseen and it is impractical to require adoption of the
liquidation plan on or before the day of conversion," and therefore
recommended, in order that involuntary conversion occurring before
adoption of a plan of liquidation might also be covered under § 337,
that section be amended so as to provide that the requirement that
the sale or exchange (or involuntary conversion) occur within the 12month period begins (i.e. the plan is adopted) within 60 days after the
involuntary conversion. House Hearing before the Committee on
Ways and Means on Advisory GroupRecommendation on Subchapter
C, J, and K of the InternalRevenue Code, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 473,
532 (1959). This proposal was not enacted into law.
Brief for Appellant at 12, Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 954 (6th
Cir. 1973). It is interesting to note that the corporation in Morton acted within the
recommended 60-day period while the corporation in Central Tablet took nine months
to adopt a plan. See notes 34-35 supra for a chronological summary of the events in
these cases.
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tary conversion of its insured assets.
This conclusion seems viable although founded exclusively on
what the court perceived to be the congressional intent in legislating
§ 337, and the judicial intent of prior case law in extending the section to apply only to involuntary conversions which occurred after the
plan of liquidation had been adopted. However, the court rendered a
decision on the merits of the applicability of § 337 only by considering the threshhold question of the coverage of that section. Since the
court stated at the outset of the opinion that the issue to be decided
was when the casualty should be deemed to have occurred,6' it should
not have relied on a legislative intent rationale without first adequately discussing the date of the casualty question addressed in
Morton. Unfortunately, the court merely offered the opinion that it
was not bound by that decision and never refuted its reasoning. Thus,
there remains for future courts a strong argument that Congress never
intended § 337 to apply in the given situation plus an opinion, the
logic of which is substantially unchalllenged and which granted the
taxpayer the desired nonrecognition. It is this controversy which
must be reconciled either judicially or legislatively.
The congressional purpose in enacting § 337 as interpreted by the
court in Central Tablet is a convincing and compelling argument
which would prevent the extension of a remedial statute to taxpayers
not clearly entitled to its benefits. The two cases which had prompted
Congress to enact § 337 involved corporations with the intention of
liquidation and dissolution. 2 Extending § 337 to include any involuntary conversion occurring subsequent to the adoption of a plan of
liquidation by a corporation can be fairly considered as within the
spirit of congressional intent. The Commissioner's agreement on this
point, noted in Central Tablet, indicates that such treatment is no
longer an issue. However, the Sixth Circuit in Central Tablet balked
at judicially expanding § 337 to apply to a taxpayer who was not
planning liquidation when the casualty occurred, a result going beyond congressional intent in the court's view. The court's reasoning
is persuasive, yet it may indeed be too limiting a view.
The opinion in Morton also considered the congressional purpose
in enacting § 337 and concluded that the section was designed to
6

In defining the question to be answered, the court stated that "[tlhe sole issue
before us is on what date, for purposes of § 337, does the involuntary conversion that
equates with he 'sale and exchange' occur when insured capital assets are destroyed
by fire." 481 F.2d at 958.
2
See discussion of Court Holding Co. and Cumberland Public Service at note 3
supra.
6481 F.2d at 957.
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eliminate a "trap for the unwary" created by the courts." The trap
was one of technicalities, placing undue significance on the details of
transactions to determine whether the corporation or shareholders
had actually sold the property. Pursuant to a broad congressional
desire to free corporations from the technicalities, the Morton court
found room to include a pre-liquidation plan casualty within the
ambit of § 337. This taxpayer-oriented view of congressional intent,
although discussed in less depth than in Central Tablet, appears
quite open-minded but acceptable. Its rationale permitted the Eighth
Circuit to go beyond the threshold consideration which defeated the
taxpayer's argument in Central Tablet to the substantive question of
when the conversion occurred when couched in the "sale or exchange" language of § 337.
Even though the Eighth Circuit employed the strained analogy of
a commercial sale, the Morton conclusion that Congress intended to
include an insured casualty within the purview of § 337 is persuasive.
Morton states postiviely that Congress sought to free corporations
from technicalities, while the Central Tablet analysis states the purpose negatively-that these involuntary conversions were not meant
to be covered. The Sixth Circuit appears to have read the statute and
its purpose too restrictively. Involuntary conversions such as those
considered here may be properly excluded by the mechanics of the
statutory provision, but the Central Tablet opinion seems deficient
for stopping short of deciding the more important question of when
the pre-liquidation plan casualty occurs under § 337.
In comparing the equities of the results in Central Tablet and
Morton, it appears the latter decision offers the more acceptable
solution to the statutory silence of § 337. While the Sixth Circuit in
Central Tablet believed that to decide for the taxpayer would afford
the corporation an unfair advantage,65 its reasoning presumes that
the corporation can recover its market position by reinvesting and
rebuilding. The corporation's management may decide that due to
market conditions, or other valid business reasons, there would be no
possibility of resuming a profitable operation after such a serious
interruption. In effect, the decision to liquidate may have been made
for the corporation by the destruction of its assets. In that situation,
§ 103366 would be of little value, the corporation would be forced into
liquidation, and the gain realized upon receipt of the insurance proceeds would be taxed at both the corporate and shareholder level.
"387 F.2d at 444.
'481 F.2d at 959. See note 57 supra.
"See note 60 supra.

